Approximability results for stable marriage problems with ties  by Halldórsson, Magnús M. et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 306 (2003) 431–447
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Approximability results for stable marriage
problems with ties
Magn'us M. Halld'orssona , Robert W. Irvingb , Kazuo Iwamac;1 ,
David F. Manloveb;∗;2 , Shuichi Miyazakid ,
Yasufumi Moritac , Sandy Scottb
aDepartment of Computer Science, University of Iceland, Dunhaga 3, IS-107 Reykjavik, Iceland
bComputing Science Department, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK
cSchool of Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
dAcademic Center for Computing and Media Studies, Kyoto University, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
Received 5 September 2002; received in revised form 1 May 2003; accepted 14 May 2003
Communicated by J. D'7az
Abstract
We consider instances of the classical stable marriage problem in which persons may include ties in
their preference lists. We show that, in such a setting, strong lower bounds hold for the approx-
imability of each of the problems of 9nding an egalitarian, minimum regret and sex-equal stable
matching. We also consider stable marriage instances in which persons may express unacceptable
partners in addition to ties. In this setting, we prove that there are constants ; ′ such that each of
the problems of approximating a maximum and minimum cardinality stable matching within factors
of ; ′ (respectively) is NP-hard, under strong restrictions. We also give an approximation algorithm
for both problems that has a performance guarantee expressible in terms of the number of lists
with ties. This signi9cantly improves on the best-known previous performance guarantee, for the case
that the ties are sparse. Our results have applications to large-scale centralized matching schemes.
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1. Introduction
An instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem (SM) [7,17,21] involves n
men and n women, each of whom ranks all the members of the opposite sex in strict
order of preference. A matching M in I is a bijection between the men and women.
We say that a (man,woman) pair (m;w) blocks M , or is a blocking pair with respect
to M , if each of m and w prefers the other to his=her partner in M . A matching that
admits no blocking pair is said to be stable. It is known that every instance of SM
admits at least one stable matching [3], and that such a matching can be found in
O(n2) time using the Gale=Shapley algorithm [3].
The man-oriented version of the Gale=Shapley algorithm [3] yields a stable match-
ing called the man-optimal stable matching. This is the unique stable matching in
which each man has his best possible partner (and each woman her worst) among all
stable matchings. Similarly, the woman-oriented version leads to the woman-optimal
stable matching with analogous optimality conditions for the women (and pessimality
conditions for the men).
1.1. “Fair” stable matchings
In view of the fact that man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings are
woman-pessimal and man-pessimal, respectively, it is of interest to consider stable
matchings that are “fair” to both sexes in a precise sense. Given a matching M and
a person q in a given SM instance I , de9ne the cost of M for q, denoted by cM (q),
to be the ranking of pM (q) in q’s preference list, where pM (q) denotes q’s partner
in M . In other words, cM (q) is one plus the number of persons whom q prefers to
pM (q). Let U and W denote the set of men and women in I , respectively, and let M
denote the set of stable matchings in I . De9ne an egalitarian stable matching to be
a stable matching S for which c(S)= minM∈M c(M), where c(M)=
∑
q∈U∪W cM (q)
for any M ∈M. Similarly, de9ne a minimum regret stable matching to be a stable
matching S for which r(S)= minM∈M r(M), where r(M)= maxq∈U∪W cM (q) for any
M ∈M. Finally, de9ne a sex-equal stable matching to be a stable matching S for









for any M ∈M.
Intuitively, an egalitarian stable matching seeks to minimize the total cost of M
taken over all persons in I , whilst a minimum regret stable matching aims to minimize
the maximum cost of M taken over all persons in I . Finally in a sex-equal stable
matching, the total cost of M for the men in I is as close to the total cost of M for
the women in I as possible.
Denote the problems of 9nding an egalitarian, minimum regret and sex-equal stable
matching by EGALITARIAN SM, MINIMUM REGRET SM and SEX-EQUAL SM respectively, given
an instance of SM. It is known that each of EGALITARIAN SM and MINIMUM REGRET SM
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is polynomial-time solvable [13,2,6]. However SEX-EQUAL SM has been shown to be
NP-hard [16].
1.2. Ties in the preference lists
A natural generalization of SM arises when each person need not rank all members
of the opposite sex in strict order. Some of those might be indiTerent among certain
members of the opposite sex, so that preference lists may involve ties. 3 We use SMT
to stand for the variant of SM in which preference lists may include ties. (Henceforth,
we assume that a tie is of length at least two.) In this context, a matching M is stable
if there is no (man,woman) pair (m;w), each of whom strictly prefers the other to
his=her partner in M . 4
By breaking the ties arbitrarily, an instance I of SMT becomes an instance I ′ of SM,
and clearly a stable matching in I ′ is also stable in I . Thus a stable matching in I can
be found using the Gale=Shapley algorithm. (Conversely, given a stable matching M
in I , it is not diLcult to see that there is an instance IM of SM in which M is stable.
Hence a matching M is stable in I if and only if M is stable in some instance of SM
obtained from I by breaking the ties.)
The stability criterion considered here is referred to as weak stability in [11], where
two other notions of stability are formulated for SMT, so-called strong stability and
super-stability. However, an instance of SMT need not admit a strongly stable matching
or a super-stable matching [11]. By contrast, we have already seen that every instance
of SMT admits at least one weakly stable matching. Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly,
of these three de9nitions, it is weak stability that has received the most attention in the
literature [15,18–20]. We are concerned exclusively with weak stability in this paper,
and henceforth for brevity, the term stability will be used to indicate weak stability
when ties are present.
The concept of the cost of a matching for a person may easily be extended to the
SMT context. Given a matching M and a person q in an SMT instance I , cM (q) is the
(possibly joint) ranking of pM (q) in q’s preference list. In other words, cM (q) is one
plus the number of persons whom q strictly prefers to pM (q). Given this extension of
the de9nition of cM (q), each of the de9nitions of an egalitarian, minimum regret and
sex-equal stable matching in an instance of SMT follows immediately. De9ne EGALITARIAN
SMT, MINIMUM REGRET SMT and SEX-EQUAL SMT to be the analogous problems to EGALITARIAN
SM, MINIMUM REGRET SM and SEX-EQUAL SM, respectively, given an instance of SMT.
It is known that each of EGALITARIAN SMT and MINIMUM REGRET SMT is NP-hard, and
not approximable within n1−”, for any ”¿0, unless P=NP, where n is the number
of persons in a given SMT instance [18]. In this paper, we improve these results by
demonstrating that a worst possible (n) lower bound on the approximability of each
3 In this paper, we restrict attention to the case where the indiTerence takes the form of ties in the
preference lists, but the results presented extend to the general case where the preference lists are arbitrary
partial orders.
4 Implicitly here, and henceforth for other stability de9nitions, such a pair (m; w) is de9ned to block M ,
or to be a blocking pair with respect to M , as for the SM case.
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of these problems holds. In addition, we prove that a similar lower bound holds for
SEX-EQUAL SMT.
1.3. Unacceptable partners
An alternative natural extension of SM occurs when persons are permitted to express
unacceptable partners. We say that person p is acceptable to person q if p appears on
the preference list of q, and unacceptable otherwise. If person q is missing from person
p’s preference list, p is not prepared to be matched with q, or to form a blocking
pair with q. We use SMI to stand for this variant of SM where preference lists may be
incomplete.
It follows immediately that a matching M in an instance I of SMI is now a one–
one correspondence between a subset of the men and a subset of the women, such
that (m;w)∈M implies that each of m;w is acceptable to the other. Also, the revised
notion of stability may be de9ned as follows: M is stable if there is no (man,woman)
pair (m;w), each of whom is either unmatched in M and 9nds the other acceptable,
or prefers the other to his=her partner in M . (As a consequence of this de9nition,
it follows that from the point of view of 9nding stable matchings, we may assume,
without loss of generality, that p is acceptable to q if and only if q is acceptable to p.)
A stable matching in I need not be a complete matching. However, all stable match-
ings in I have the same size, and involve exactly the same men and women [4]. There-
fore, each of the de9nitions of an egalitarian, a minimum regret and a sex-equal stable
matching in an instance of SMI follows immediately from its SM de9nition if we discard
the unmatched men and women from consideration. In addition, it is a simple matter
to extend the Gale=Shapley algorithm to the SMI setting (see [7, Section 1.4.2]).
1.4. Ties and unacceptable partners
The variant of the stable marriage problem which incorporates both extensions de-
scribed above is denoted SMTI. Thus, an instance I of SMTI comprises preference lists,
each of which may involve ties and=or unacceptable partners. A combination of the
earlier de9nitions indicates that a matching M in I is stable if there is no (man,woman)
pair (m;w), each of whom is either unmatched in M and 9nds the other acceptable,
or strictly prefers the other to his=her partner in M .
As observed above, all stable matchings for a given instance of SMI are of the same
size, and all stable matchings for a given instance of SMT are complete (and therefore of
the same size). However, for a given instance of SMTI, it is no longer the case that all
stable matchings need be of the same size [18]. Furthermore, each of the problems of
9nding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size, given an SMTI instance, is NP-
hard [15,18]. Therefore, one is naturally led to consider the approximability properties
of each of these problems. It turns out that each problem admits an approximation
algorithm with a performance ratio of 2, since the size of any stable matching is at
least half the size of a maximum cardinality stable matching and is at most twice the
size of a minimum cardinality stable matching [18]. This has left open the question of
whether better approximation algorithms for these problems exist.
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In this paper, we present both positive and negative results regarding the approx-
imability of each of these problems: we show that the existence of a polynomial-time
approximation scheme (PTAS) for either of these problems is unlikely, since there exist
constants ; ′ such that approximating each problem within a factor of ; ′ (respec-
tively) is NP-hard, under strong restrictions on the instance. However, we also show
that, for a given SMTI instance I , the diTerence in size between a maximum and a min-
imum cardinality stable matching is bounded by t(I), the number of preference lists
that contain ties, and this leads to an approximation algorithm for both problems with
a performance guarantee dependent on t(I). When t(I) is relatively small compared to
the size of the instance, our result signi9cantly improves on the best-known previous
result regarding the approximability of both problems, namely the performance ratio
of 2.
1.5. Practical applications
The problems of 9nding “fair” stable matchings and maximum cardinality stable
matchings in a given instance of SMTI have particular signi9cance in practical applica-
tions. In a number of countries, large-scale automated matching schemes produce stable
matchings of graduating medical students to hospital posts based on the preferences
of students over hospitals and vice versa. Examples of such schemes are the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [20] in the U.S., the Canadian Resident Matching
Service (CaRMS) [1] and the Scottish Pre-registration house oLcer Allocation scheme
(SPA) [12].
The algorithms employed by the NRMP and CaRMS essentially solve a many-one
generalization of SMI called the Hospitals=Residents problem (HR) [7, Section 1.6]. In
the context of these two matching schemes, hospitals must rank a possibly large number
of applicants in strict order of preference. However, it is unrealistic to expect large and
popular hospitals to provide a strict ranking of all of their applicants. The SPA scheme
permits hospitals to include ties, a situation which may be modelled by a many-one
matching problem known as the Hospitals=Residents problem with Ties (HRT) [14], a
generalization of each of HR and SMTI.
Thus, since the stable matchings in an instance of SMTI may be of diTerent sizes, the
same is true for HRT. Yet a prime objective of any matching scheme must be to match
as many applicants as possible, and hence this motivates the search for large stable
matchings. In addition, administrators of matching schemes may be interested to 9nd
stable matchings that are as fair as possible for both applicants and hospitals alike, and
hence this motivates the search for egalitarian, minimum regret and sex-equal stable
matchings. Thus our approximability results have implications for matching schemes
such as SPA.
1.6. Organization of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we prove that
it is hard to approximate the MIN MAXIMAL MATCHING optimization problem (de9ned in
that section) in a certain class of graphs. This result is required in order to establish,
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in Section 3, the hardness results for the problems of approximating a maximum or
minimum cardinality stable matching in a given instance of SMTI. Then, in Section 4
we present the approximation algorithm for the variants of these problems where, in
a given SMTI instance, the number of lists containing ties is bounded. The (n) lower
bounds for each of the problems of approximating EGALITARIAN SMT, MINIMUM REGRET SMT
and SEX-EQUAL SMT are presented in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we present some
concluding remarks.
2. Hardness of approximating MIN MAXIMAL MATCHING
We begin this section with some graph-related de9nitions. Given a graph G=(V; E),
a strongly stable set S is a subset of V such that the distance between every pair of
vertices in S is at least 3. A matching M in G is maximal if no proper superset of M
is a matching in G. Let 0(G), SS(G) and −1 (G) denote, respectively, the sizes of
a maximum independent set, a maximum strongly stable set and a minimum maximal
matching in G. De9ne MIN MAXIMAL MATCHING to be the problem of computing −1 (G),
given a graph G.
MIN MAXIMAL MATCHING is NP-hard, even for subdivision graphs of graphs of maximum
degree 3 [10] (given a graph G, the subdivision graph of G, denoted by S(G), is
obtained by subdividing each edge {u; w} of G in order to obtain two edges {u; v} and
{v; w} of S(G), where v is a new vertex). In this section, we will establish that MIN
MAXIMAL MATCHING is hard to approximate in a certain graph class; this result will be
required in the next section. In particular, we will prove the following:
Theorem 1. It is NP-hard to approximate MIN MAXIMAL MATCHING within 0, for some
0¿1. The result holds even if the instance is restricted to be the subdivision graph
of some cubic graph.
Our proof of Theorem 1 involves a chain of reductions starting from MAX-IS. This
is the problem of computing 0(G), given a graph G. We denote by MAX-IS(k) the
restriction of MAX-IS in which G is regular of degree k.
Theorem 2 (Halld'orsson and Yoshihara [9]). It is NP-hard to approximate MAX-IS(3)
within 1, for some 1¡1.
In fact, there exists a constant c1¿0 such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between in-
stances G=(V; E) of MAX-IS(3) such that 0(G)¿c1n and 0(G)¡1c1n, where n= |V |.
We will use Theorem 2 together with the notion of a gap-preserving reduction [22,
p. 308], which may be de9ned as follows:
Denition 3. Let 1 and 2 be two optimization problems. Denote by OPTi(x) the
optimal measure over all feasible solutions for a given instance x of i (i∈{1; 2}).
Let # be some constant (#61 if 1 is a maximization problem; #¿1 otherwise), and
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let g1 be a function that maps an instance x of 1 to a positive rational number. Then
a gap-preserving reduction from 1 to 2 is a tuple 〈f; ; g2〉 such that:
• f maps an instance x of 1 to an instance f(x) of 2 in polynomial time;
•  is a constant (61 if 2 is a maximization problem; ¿1 otherwise);
• g2 maps an instance f(x) of 2 to a positive rational number;
• if 1 and 2 are maximization problems, then for any instance x of 1:
◦ if OPT1(x)¿g1(x), then OPT2(f(x))¿g2(f(x));
◦ if OPT1(x)¡#g1(x), then OPT2(f(x))¡g2(f(x));
(if i is a minimization problem, for i∈{1; 2}, then the two inequalities involving
OPTi in the above conditions should be reversed).
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of De9nition 3.
Proposition 4. Let 1 and 2 be two maximization problems, and suppose that there
is a gap-preserving reduction from 1 to 2. Assuming the notation of DeCnition 3,
suppose further that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances x of 1 such that
OPT1(x)¿g1(x) and OPT1(x)¡#g1(x). Then it is NP-hard to distinguish between
instances f(x) of 2 such that OPT2(f(x))¿g2(f(x)) and OPT2(f(x))¡g2(f(x)).
(If i is a minimization problem, for i∈{1; 2}, then the two inequalities involving
OPTi in the above conditions should be reversed). Hence it is NP-hard to approximate
2 within .
Our 9rst gap-preserving reduction involves MAX-SSS. This is the problem of computing
SS(G) for a given graph G. We denote by MAX-SSS(k) the restriction of MAX-SSS in
which G is regular of degree k.
Theorem 5. It is NP-hard to approximate MAX-SSS(3) within 2, for some 2¡1.
Proof. Let G=(V; E) be a cubic graph, given as an instance of MAX-IS(3), where n= |V |
and m= |E|. We construct a cubic graph G′=(V ′; E′) as an instance of MAX-SSS(3) as
follows. As in the proof of Corollary 3.4 of [10], we initially replace every edge {v; w}
of G by a component comprising the edges {v; u}; {u; w}; {u; u′}; {u′; u′′}. This leaves
m vertices of degree 1 in G′ and m vertices of degree 2 in G′.
We may eliminate such vertices as follows. To every vertex v of degree 1 in G′,
connect the component shown in Fig. 1(a). Similarly, for every vertex v of degree 2
in G′, connect the component shown in Fig. 1(b). It is then clear that the modi9ed
graph G′ is cubic.
It is straightforward to verify that G has an independent set of size k if and only
if G′ has a strongly stable set of size 3m+ k, and hence SS(G′)= 0(G) + 3m. Now
2m=3n as G is cubic, and it may be veri9ed that n′=22n, where n′= |V ′|.
Now let c1 and 1 be the constants given by Theorem 2, such that it is NP-hard
to distinguish between the cases 0(G)¿c1n and 0(G)¡1c1n. Hence if 0(G)¿
c1n, then SS(G′)¿c2n′, whilst if 0(G)¡1c1n, then SS(G′)¡2c2n′, where c2 =
(2c1 + 9)=44 and 2 = (21c1 + 9)=(2c1 + 9). The result then follows by Theorem 2
and Proposition 4.
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Fig. 1. Components attached to vertices of degree 1 or 2 in G′.
Our second gap-preserving reduction is suLcient to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let G=(V; E) be a cubic graph, given as an instance of MAX-
SSS(3), where n= |V | and m= |E|. The constructed instance of MIN MAXIMAL MATCHING is
S(G) (recall that S(G) is the subdivision graph of G). Now by Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 of
[10], G has a strongly stable set of size k if and only if S(G) has a maximal matching
of size n−k. Thus it follows that −1 (S(G))+SS(G)= n. Now 2m=3n as G is cubic,
and m′=2m, where m′ is the number of edges of S(G).
Now let c2 and 2 be the constants given by Theorem 5, such that it is NP-hard to
distinguish between the cases SS(G)¿c2n and SS(G)¡2c2n. Hence if SS(G)¿c2n,
then −1 (S(G))6c0m
′, whilst if SS(G)¡2c2n, then −1 (S(G))¿0c0m
′, where c0 =
(1 − c2)=3 and 0 = (1 − 2c2)=(1 − c2). The result then follows by Theorem 5 and
Proposition 4.
3. Hardness of approximating MAX SMTI and MIN SMTI
Given an instance I of SMTI, let s+(I) (respectively, s−(I)) denote the size of
a maximum (respectively, minimum) cardinality stable matching in I . De9ne MAX
(respectively, MIN) SMTI to be the problem of computing s+(I) (respectively, s−(I)),
given an SMTI instance I .
Each of MAX SMTI and MIN SMTI is NP-hard [15,18]. In this section, we prove that
there exist constants ; ′ such that each of the problems of approximating MAX SMTI
and MIN SMTI within a factor of ; ′ (respectively) is NP-hard. In each case, the result
holds under the restriction that the ties belong to the preference lists of one sex only,
and preference lists have constant length. We begin by considering MAX SMTI.
Theorem 6. It is NP-hard to approximate MAX SMTI within 3, for some 3¡1. The
result holds even if the preference lists in the given instance are of constant length,
there is at most one tie per list, and the ties occur on one side only.
Proof. Let G=(V; E) be the subdivision graph of some cubic graph, given as an
instance of MIN MAXIMAL MATCHING. Then G has a bipartition of V into the left-hand
vertex set U and the right-hand vertex set W , where every vertex in U has degree 3
and every vertex in W has degree 2.
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Let U = {m1; m2; : : : ; ms} and W = {w1; w2; : : : ; wt}. For each i (16i6s), assume that
mi is adjacent in G to the vertices in Wi, where Wi = {wk3i−2 ; wk3i−1 ; wk3i}. Also, assume
that pj and qj are two sequences such that pj¡qj, {mpj ; wj}∈E and {mqj ; wj}∈E
(16j6t).
We form an instance I of MAX SMTI as follows. Let U be the set of men in I , where
U=U ∪X ∪Z , X = {x1; x2; : : : ; xt}, and Z = {z1; z2; : : : ; zt}. Also, let W be the set of
women in I , where W=W ∪W ′ ∪Y , W ′= {w′1; w′2; : : : ; w′t}, and Y = {y1; y2; : : : ; ys}.
For each i (16i6s), let W ′i = {w′k3i−2 ; w′k3i−1 ; w′k3i}. Clearly |U|= |W|= s+ 2t. Create
a preference list for each person in I as follows:
mi : (Wi ∪W ′i ) yi (16 i 6 s);
xi : wi (16 i 6 t);
zi : (wi w′i) (16 i 6 t);
wj : zj mpj mqj xj (16 j 6 t);
w′j : zj mqj mpj (16 j 6 t);
yj : mj (16 j 6 s):
Note that, in a given preference list throughout this paper, persons listed within round
brackets are tied. Clearly the ties in I occur in the men’s preference lists only and
there is at most one tie per list. Also each man’s list has length at most 7, whilst each
woman’s list has length at most 4.
Suppose that M is a maximal matching in G, where |M |= −1 (G). We construct a
matching M ′ in I as follows. For each i (16i6s), suppose 9rstly that mi is matched
in M , to wj say (16j6t). If i=pj, add the pairs (mi; wj) and (zj; w′j) to M
′. If i= qj,
add the pairs (mi; w′j) and (zj; wj) to M
′.
On the other hand, if mi is unmatched, add the pair (mi; yi) to M ′.
Finally, for any j (16j6t), if wj is unmatched, add the pairs (xj; wj) and (zj; w′j)
to M ′.
Clearly M ′ is a matching in I , and |M ′|=2|M |+(s−|M |)+2(t−|M |)= s+2t−|M |.
It is straightforward to verify that no man in X ∪ Z can belong to a blocking pair of
M ′. Now suppose that (mi; w) blocks M ′ for some i (16i6s) and w∈W. Then
(mi; yi)∈M ′, so that w=wj for some j (16j6t) and (xj; wj)∈M ′. Thus each of
mi and wj is unmatched in M , and {mi; wj}∈E. Thus M ∪{{mi; wj}} is a matching
in G, contradicting the maximality of M . Hence M ′ is stable in I . Also s+(I)¿
s+ 2t − |M |= s+ 2t − −1 (G).
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I , where |M ′|= s+(I). For




{mi; wj} : (16 i 6 s) ∧ (16 j 6 t)∧((mi; wj) ∈ M ′ ∨ (mi; w′j) ∈ M ′)
}
is a matching in G. Also |M ′|6|M | + (t − |M |) + t + (s − |M |)= s + 2t − |M |, for
every edge in M contributes one (man,woman) pair to M ′, and in addition, at most
(t − |M |) men in X can be matched in M ′, exactly t men in Z are matched in M ′,
and at most (s− |M |) women in Y can be matched in M ′ (and everybody who could
be matched in M ′ has now been counted).
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Suppose that M is not maximal. Then there is some edge {mi; wj} in G such that
no edge of M is incident to either mi or wj. Thus by de9nition of M , either mi
is unmatched in M ′ or (mi; yi)∈M ′. Similarly, either (i) (xj; wj)∈M ′ or wj is un-
matched, or (ii) w′j is unmatched in M
′. In case (i) (mi; wj) blocks M ′, whilst in case
(ii) (mi; w′j) blocks M
′, a contradiction. Hence M is a maximal matching in G, and
s+(I)= |M ′|6s+ 2t − |M |6s+ 2t − −1 (G).
Hence s+(I) + −1 (G)= s+2t. Now 2t=3s, as G is the subdivision graph of some
cubic graph. Also n= s+ 2t and m=2t, where n is the number of men in I and m is
the number of edges of G.
Let c0 and 0 be the constants given by Theorem 1, such that it is NP-hard to
distinguish between the cases −1 (G)6c0m and 
−
1 (G)¿0c0m. Hence if 
−
1 (G)6c0m,
then s+(I)¿c3n, whilst if −1 (G)¿0c0m, then s
+(I)¡3c3n, where c3 = (4 − 3c0)=4
and 3 = (4−30c0)=(4−3c0). The result then follows by Theorem 1 and Proposition 4.
We now demonstrate how to modify the proof of Theorem 6 in order to establish
the hardness of approximating MIN SMTI under the same restrictions.
Theorem 7. It is NP-hard to approximate MIN SMTI within 4, for some 4¿1. The
result holds even if the preference lists in I are of constant length, there is at most
one tie per list, and the ties occur on one side only.
Proof. The gap-preserving reduction is similar to the one given by the proof of The-
orem 6, with some small modi9cations. In the constructed instance I , the set of men
and women no longer includes the persons in X ∪Y . Any such person is now re-
moved from the preference list of any remaining person in I . Now each man’s pref-
erence list is of length at most 6 and each woman’s preference list is of length at
most 3.
Suppose 9rstly that M is a maximal matching in G, where |M |= −1 (G). The con-
struction of the matching M ′ in I is similar to the previous one; the only diTerence is
as follows. If mi is unmatched in M , no pair is added to M ′, whilst if wj is unmatched
in M , the pair (zj; wj) is added to M ′. It is straightforward to verify that M ′ is a stable
matching in I and s−(I)6|M ′|= t + |M |= t + −1 (G).
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I , where |M ′|= s−(I). Then
using a similar argument to before we may construct a maximal matching M in G,
where s−(I)= |M ′|= t + |M |¿t + −1 (G).
Hence s−(I)= t+−1 (G). Now 2t=3s, as G is the subdivision graph of some cubic
graph. Also n= s + t and m=2t, where n is the number of men in I and m is the
number of edges of G.
Let c0 and 0 be the constants given by Theorem 1, such that it is NP-hard to
distinguish between the cases −1 (G)6c0m and 
−
1 (G)¿0c0m. Hence if 
−
1 (G)6c0m,
then s−(I)6c4n, whilst if −1 (G)¿0c0m, then s
−(I)¡4c4n, where c4 = 3(1+2c0)=5
and 4 = (1+20c0)=(1+2c0). The result then follows by Theorem 1 and Proposition 4.
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It follows immediately from Theorems 6 and 7 that neither MAX SMTI nor MIN SMTI
admits a polynomial-time approximation scheme unless P=NP.
4. Approximation algorithm for MAX SMTI and MIN SMTI
As observed earlier, it is shown in [18] that a maximum cardinality stable matching
can have size at most twice that of a minimum cardinality stable matching. Hence,
the obvious polynomial-time algorithm for SMTI—break all ties in an arbitrary way and
apply the classical Gale=Shapley algorithm to the resulting instance of SMI—is simul-
taneously an approximation algorithm for both MAX and MIN SMTI with a performance
ratio of 2.
There is no known approximation algorithm for either problem with a stronger per-
formance ratio, even for special cases of the problems in which the ties are restricted
to one side, or to the tails of the preference lists. A case of particular interest arises
when there is a limit on the number of preference lists that contain ties, and in this sec-
tion we show that some progress can be made in establishing additional approximation
bounds in this setting.
Ideally, in the case of MAX SMTI, one might hope for a bound of the form s+(I)=|M |6
f(p) given an instance I of SMTI, where M is a stable matching found by some ap-
proximation algorithm (or just any stable matching, found by breaking ties arbitrarily),
p is the proportion of preference lists that contain ties, and f(p) is a function that
decreases to 1 as p decreases to 0.
However, it is not hard to see that a bound of this form is infeasible. Were such
an algorithm to exist, a ‘gap’ argument could be used to show that it could solve
instances of MAX SMTI exactly. Given an arbitrary such instance, it could be ‘expanded’
by the addition of new persons, none of whom has a tie in his or her list, and none of
whom can be matched in any stable matching. With an appropriate expansion factor,
application of the supposed approximation algorithm to this derived instance would
solve the original instance exactly.
Instead we derive a bound on the diDerence in size between a maximum (or mini-
mum) cardinality stable matching and an arbitrary stable matching, expressed in terms
of the number of preference lists that contain ties. So the usual approximation algorithm
—break all ties arbitrarily and apply the Gale/Shapley algorithm—has a performance
guarantee, for both MAX SMTI and MIN SMTI, expressible as a diTerence rather than a ratio.
As observed by Garey and Johnson [5, pp. 137–138], this form of performance guar-
antee can reasonably be viewed as being stronger than the more familiar performance
ratio form, and there are relatively few NP-hard problems for which approximation
algorithms with performance guarantees of this kind are known.
Some additional de9nitions are necessary before presenting the main results of this
section. Let M and M ′ be stable matchings for an instance I of SMTI. If a person p
strictly prefers his partner in M to his partner in M ′, or is matched in M but not
in M ′, then we say that p strictly prefers M to M ′. If p is indiTerent between his
partners in M and M ′, or has the same partner in M as in M ′, or is matched in neither
M nor M ′, then we say that p is indiDerent between M and M ′. De9ne a tied pair
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to be a pair (m;w) such that m is in a tie in w’s list, or w is in a tie in m’s list (or
both). In what follows, tp(M) denotes the number of tied pairs in M , and t(I) denotes
the number of preference lists in I that contain ties. In general tp(M) depends on the
matching M , whilst t(I) is invariant for the given instance I ; clearly tp(M)6t(I). 5
Lemma 8. Let T be a maximum cardinality stable matching for a given instance I
of SMTI. Then if M is an arbitrary stable matching in I , |T |6|M |+ tp(M).
Proof. We construct an undirected graph G=G(M; T ) as follows: G has a vertex for
each person in I , and two vertices are joined by a blue (respectively, red) edge if the
corresponding persons are matched in T but not in M (respectively in M but not in
T ). It is clear that the connected components of G are paths and cycles with edges
of alternating colour. Furthermore, |T | − |M | is at most equal to the number of blue
augmenting paths in G, i.e., the number of paths of odd length in which the 9rst and
last edges are blue. Further, every such path has at least three edges, since a component
that is a path of length one would provide a blocking pair for one of the supposed
stable matchings.
We claim that, in every blue augmenting path, at least one of the intermediate
vertices represents a person who is indiTerent between T and M , and is therefore in a
tied pair in both T and M . This claim, together with the preceding observation, suLces
to establish the lemma.
To establish the claim, let p1; q1; : : : ; pr; qr form a blue augmenting path in G, for
some r¿2. Since p1 and qr are both matched in T but not in M , they both strictly
prefer T to M . Suppose that no person in the path is indiTerent between T and M . A
simple inductive proof starting from p1 then reveals that qi (i=1; 2; : : : ; r − 1) strictly
prefers M to T , otherwise (pi; qi) would block M , and pi (i=2; 3; : : : ; r) strictly prefers
T to M , otherwise (pi; qi−1) would block T . Thus (pr; qr) blocks M , a contradiction.
Hence at least one of the pi (26i6r) or qi (16i6r−1) must be indiTerent between
T and M , as claimed.
Since tp(M)6|M |, it follows immediately by Lemma 8 that there exists an approx-
imation algorithm for MAX SMTI with performance ratio 2. Using a similar argument to
the one employed in the proof of Lemma 8, we may deduce that |M |6|S| + tp(S),
where S is a stable matching of minimum cardinality. Since tp(S)6|S|, it follows
immediately that there exists an approximation algorithm for MIN SMTI, also with per-
formance ratio 2. The inequality established by Lemma 8 also leads to the following
result:
Theorem 9. There is an approximation algorithm A such that, given any instance I of
either MAX SMTI or MIN SMTI, A Cnds a stable matching M in I satisfying the following
5 The results of this section may be extended to the case that preference lists are partially ordered by
making the following amendments to two key de9nitions. In this setting, de9ne a tied pair to be a pair
(m; w) such that w is indiTerent between m and some other man, or m is indiTerent between w and some
other woman (or both). De9ne t(I) to be the number of preference lists that are not linearly ordered.
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inequality:
s+(I)− t(I)6 |M |6 s−(I) + t(I):
Additionally, we have that s+(I)6s−(I) + t(I).
Proof. Let M be de9ned as in Lemma 8. Since tp(M)6t(I), Lemma 8 implies that
s+(I)− t(I)6|M |6s+(I). Also by Lemma 8, s+(I)6s−(I)+ t(I), and hence the result
follows.
We remark that, when the ties in a given instance I of SMTI are sparse, i.e. t(I) is
small compared to the numbers of men and women in I , the performance guarantee
indicated by Theorem 9 is a signi9cant improvement on the best-known previous result,
namely the 2-approximation algorithm for each of MAX SMTI and MIN SMTI.
The following instance is an illustration of the worst case for the above theorem. For
each n¿1, we de9ne an SMTI instance I with 2n men, namely {p1; : : : ; pn; q1; : : : ; qn},
and 2n women, namely {r1; : : : ; rn; s1; : : : ; sn}. For each i (16i6n), de9ne preference
lists for pi; qi; ri; si as follows:
pi : si ri ri : pi
qi : si si : (pi qi)
There is a stable matching of size n (namely M1 = {(pi; si): 16i6n}) and one of size
2n (namely M2 = {(pi; ri); (qi; si): 16i6n}). Clearly s+(I)= 2n, and also s−(I)= n
since |M2|=2|M1|. Since the diTerence between s+(I) and s−(I) is the number of lists
with ties, the bounds given by Theorem 9 are tight.
5. “Fair” stable matchings in SMT
In this section, we give (n) lower bounds for the approximability of EGALITARIAN
SMT, MINIMUM REGRET SMT and SEX-EQUAL SMT in an instance of SMT with n men and n
women. We begin by considering EGALITARIAN SMT. Note that, for any matching M in
such an instance of SMT, it follows that 2n6c(M)62n2. Hence an approximation algo-
rithm with performance guarantee n is trivial. Our inapproximability result is therefore
optimal within a constant factor.
Theorem 10. It is NP-hard to approximate EGALITARIAN SMT within n, for some
¿0, where n is the number of men in a given SMT instance.
Proof. We give a reduction from an instance I of MAX SMTI as constructed by the
proof of Theorem 6. One property of I is that there exists a constant d such that
the length of each preference list in I is at most d. Let c3 and 3 be the constants
given by Theorem 6, such that it is NP-hard to distinguish the cases s+(I)¿c3n and
s+(I)¡3c3n, where n is the number of men in I .
Let X = {m1; m2; : : : ; mn} be the set of men in I and let Y = {w1; w2; : : : ; wn} be the
set of women of I . For each i (16i6n), let Pi and Qi denote the preference lists of
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mi and wi in I , respectively. We call the women in Pi proper women for mi, and we
call the men in Qi proper men for wi.
We transform I into an instance I ′ of EGALITARIAN SMT as follows. Let U =X ∪X ′ and
W =Y ∪Y ′ be the sets of men and women in I ′, respectively, where X ′= {m′1; m′2; : : : ;
m′(1−c3)n} and Y ′= {w′1; w′2; : : : ; w′(1−c3)n}. The preference lists in I ′ are constructed as
follows:
mi : Pi (Y ′) [Y\Pi] (16 i 6 n);
m′i : (W ) (16 i 6 (1− c3)n);
wi : Qi (X ′) [X \Qi] (16 i 6 n);
w′i : (U ) (16 i 6 (1− c3)n):
Note that, in a given person’s preference list, persons within square brackets are listed
in arbitrary strict order where the symbol appears.
Suppose 9rstly that I has a stable matching M such that |M |¿c3n. Then there is a
set Xu⊆X of men who are unmatched in M , where |Xu|6(1− c3)n. Similarly there is
a set Yu⊆Y of women who are unmatched in M , where |Yu|6(1 − c3)n. Let M1 be
a matching that assigns each man in Xu to a woman in Y ′, and let M2 be a matching
that assigns each woman in Yu to a man in X ′. Now let M3 be a perfect matching of
the remaining unmatched members of X ′ and Y ′. Finally, let M ′=M ∪M1 ∪M2 ∪M3.
It may be veri9ed that M ′ is a stable matching in I ′, and
c(M ′)6 2n(d+ 1) + 2(1− c3)n
6 2n(d+ 2):
On the other hand, suppose s+(I)¡3c3n. Now let M ′ be any stable matching in I ′.
Then ¡3c3n men in X are matched in M ′ to one of their proper women. Now at
most (1− c3)n of the remaining men in X can be matched to a woman in Y ′. Hence
there are ¿c3n(1 − 3) men u in X such that cM ′(u)¿(1 − c3)n. Similarly there are
¿c3n(1−3) women w in Y such that cM ′(w)¿(1− c3)n. Hence c(M ′)¿2”n2, where
”= c3(1− c3)(1− 3).
Therefore by Theorem 6, it is NP-hard to approximate EGALITARIAN SMT within
”n=(d+ 2).
We now consider MINIMUM REGRET SMT. Note that, for any matching M in an instance
of SMT with n men and n women, it follows that 16r(M)6n. Hence, an approximation
algorithm with performance guarantee n is trivial. Therefore again, the (n) lower
bound that we establish is optimal within a constant factor.
Theorem 11. It is NP-hard to approximate MINIMUM REGRET SMT within n, for some
¿0, where n is the number of men in a given SMT instance.
Proof. We use the same reduction as described in the proof of Theorem 10. Let I ,
I ′, n, c3, 3 and d be as above. If s+(I)¿c3n, then I ′ has a stable matching M ′ such
that r(M ′)6d+1. On the other hand, if s+(I)¡3c3n then in any stable matching M ′
in I ′, at least one man u∈X satis9es cM ′(u)¿(1 − c3)n. Hence r(M ′) ¿ (1 − c3)n.
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Therefore by Theorem 6, it is NP-hard to approximate MINIMUM REGRET SMT within
(1− c3)n=(d+ 1).
The 9nal problem that we consider in this section is SEX-EQUAL SMT. We establish an
inapproximability result for this problem similar to those of Theorems 10 and 11.
Theorem 12. It is NP-hard to approximate SEX-EQUAL SMT within n, for some ¿0,
where n is the number of men in a given SMT instance.
Proof. We formulate a reduction similar to the one described in the proof of Theo-
rem 10. Let I , X , X ′, Y , Y ′, Pi, Qi, n, c3, 3 and d be as above. We transform I into an
instance I ′ of SEX-EQUAL SMT as follows. Let U =X ∪X ′ ∪ S and W =Y ∪Y ′ ∪T be the
sets of men and women in I ′, respectively, where S = {s1; s2; : : : ; sd} and T = {t1; t2; : : : ;
td}. The preference lists in I ′ are constructed as follows:
mi : Pi (W\Pi) (16 i 6 n);
m′i : (W ) (16 i 6 (1− c3)n);
si : ti [W\{ti}] (16 i 6 d);
wi : [S] Qi (X ′) [X \Qi] (16 i 6 n);
w′i : (U ) (16 i 6 (1− c3)n);
ti : si [U\{si}] (16 i 6 d):
Clearly in any stable matching M ′ in I ′, (si; ti)∈M ′.
Suppose 9rstly that I has a stable matching M such that |M |¿c3n. Then we may
form M ′ as in the proof of Theorem 10. Add (si; ti) to M ′ (16i6d). It may be
veri9ed that M ′ is stable in I ′. Also the total cost of M ′ for the men is at most
(d+1)n+(1−c3)n+d. Similarly the total cost of M ′ for the women is at most (2d+









u∈X cM ′(u) +
∑
w∈Y cM ′(w)= (3d+ 2)n.
On the other hand, suppose that s+(I)¡3c3n. Now let M ′ be any stable matching
in I ′. As in the previous paragraph, the total cost of M ′ for the men is at most
(d + 1)n + (1 − c3)n + d. No woman w∈Y is matched in M ′ to a man in S, so
cM ′(w)¿d+ 1. As in the proof of Theorem 10, there are ¿c3n(1− 3) women w in
Y such that cM ′(w)¿(d + 1) + (1 − c3)n. Hence the total cost of M ′ for the women
is more than
(d+ 1)n+ c3n(1− 3)(1− c3)n+ (1− c3)n+ d:
Thus d(M ′)¿”n2, where ” is as de9ned in the proof of Theorem 10.
Therefore by Theorem 6, it is NP-hard to approximate SEX-EQUAL SMT within
”n=(3d+ 2).
6. Concluding remarks
It is interesting to note that the hardness results proved in this paper for approxi-
mating both MAX SMTI and MIN SMTI hold for identical restrictions on the positions of
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ties—there are relatively few examples in the literature of optimization problems hav-
ing both maximization and minimization versions that are hard to approximate, and
fewer still where this property holds for the same restrictions on the instance.
It remains open as to whether there exists an approximation algorithm for either MAX
SMTI or MIN SMTI having performance ratio less than 2. However, the progress made in
this paper indicates that improvements can be obtained when ties are restricted in
number. One might hope for further progress when there are additional constraints in
place—on the positions and lengths of ties, for example.
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